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The Antinomy of Coherence and
Determinacy
William A. Edmundson*
"We must keep up the boundaries of actions, otherwise we shall introduce
the utmost confusion."
-Lord Raymond, in Reynokls v. Clark1
I. INTRODUCTION
Two appealing ideas about law turn out to be in conflict. The first
idea is that the law is or should be coherent in some sense. That is, the law
should or does make sense as a whole, hang together, or fit together in
some way. The second idea is that the law is or should be determinate, that
is, what the law demands is or should be fixed and unambiguous, and in
that sense objective and independent of what courts or other legal
interpreters make of it.
I will assume that both of these ideas are appealing both in the sense
of actually possessing an appeal to many people and in the sense of
meriting the appeal they have. I will argue that there is a tension between
these two ideas that means that their respective appeals are bound to pull
us in conflicting directions.
The conflict is not immediately apparent, nor is it a conceptual
necessity. In part, it is the product of a contingent truth about the law that
the Legal Realists first noted: to the extent that we wish our law to be
determinate, we must be prepared to insist that the body of legal doctrine
be structured, which is to say that it contain distinct internal territories,
typically defined by explicit boundaries such as those between contract and
tort, or between state action and private agreement-although the greater
number of examples will divide much smaller territories, for example,
economic strike versus unfair-labor-practices strike. I will call this the
Partitioning Thesis.
Lacking such partitions, too many legal norms will become relevant in
deciding a case, with the result that the decisionmaker will be called upon
to consider and choose between conflicting norms without sufficient
guidance or-what comes to the same thing-with a superabundance of
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. I thank George Rainbolt,
Eric Segall, Jeffrey Tucker, 1lrk Ludwig, and Steve Friedland for their comments on the ideas
presented here. I owe a special debt of thanks to Ken Kress for his careful reading and
provocative comments.
1. 1 Strange 634, 635 (1725).
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it.2 This will in turn detract from the ordinary citizen's ability to know ex
ante what the law demands of her.
The idea of coherence is the other contributor to the conflict.
Coherence is widely understood to mean, in Ken Kress's words, a relation
among propositions that is "more strict than logical consistency, yet less
strict than logical entailment."3 Were coherence nothing more than
consistency, an antinomy between coherence and determinacy would not
exist. Whenever two inconsistent decisions remain unreconciled, there is a
greater degree of indeterminacy than would otherwise obtain; and, by a
process of mopping up inconsistencies in the law, one could enhance
determinacy. Likewise, to the extent that the law loses determinacy--as a
result of poor judicial craftsmanship or legislative hyperactivity, for
example-the likelihood of outright inconsistencies popping up is
increased. Consistency and determinacy could increase together without
limit; law could, in that sense, "work itself pure." But coherence is not
mere consistency-it is "consistency plus," and the "plus" creates the
difficulty I want to discuss.
The key part of the "plus" component of coherence is captured by a
principle stated by Laurence Bonjour, which I will call the Anti-Partitioning
Principle:
The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent
to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are
relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections.5
Seeking coherence is, in part, a process of deciding between mutually
incompatible theories on the basis of their relative degrees of coherence.
Where legal theories T and T differ only in that T contains rule or
principle P and T' contains P', which in turn differ only in that P is
"more connected" to other members of T than P' is to other members of
T, valuing coherence demands that we accord
great importance ... to the degree of systematic connectedness
involved; we will be more reluctant to give up a rule or principle
which has many connections with other rules and principles we
wish to hold on to than we will to abandon or modify one which
stands in virtual independence of other rules and principles.6
To the extent that we prefer P to P', we.will prefer T to T', according to
the Anti-Partitioning Principle, and a court will be better justified in
2. See Ken Kress, Coherence and Fonmaism, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Po1'y 639, 678 (1993)
[hereinafter Kress, Coherce and Fonnasm]. See generaly Ken Kress, Coherence in A Companion
to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 533 (D. Patterson ed., 1996).
3. Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Cohere Theorie" Davosin's Rights Thesis,
Retroacivity, and the Linear Order ofDwisions, 72 Cal. L Rev. 369, 370 (1984).
4. I am using the term "antinomy" to mean a conflict between otherwise welounded
principles. This is a looser sense of the word than Qyine's, sew W.V. Quine, The Ways of
Paradox 5-6 (1966), and perhaps even Kant's, see L Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 384-484 (N.
Kemp Smith ed., 1929).
5. Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge 98 (1985).
6. RolfSartorius, 7heJustifiation of theJuNdalDedsion, 78 Ethics 184 (1968).
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grounding a decision on T and P than on T' and P'. We might go further
and say that T and P are law, and T and P' not the law, citing coherence
as our ground.
The antinomy of coherence and determinacy is simply the conflict
between the Anti-Partitioning Principle, as applied to the law, and the
Partitioning Thesis, as derived from the Legal Realists' studies of Anglo-
American law. The significance of the antinomy is that the two appealing
ideas about the law, which I mentioned at the outset, pervasively
undermine each other. Although they are in a logical sense reconcilable,
reflection on the example of the tort of privacy will show that the balance
we strike between them will be ad hoc, leaving us with a sense that their
reconciliation can never reflect more than the evanescent particularity of
the case at hand. To that extent, the antinomy has a skeptical and even
antitheoretic import.
Before going further, however, I -will first show why the Partitioning
Thesis is plausible. I will then discuss the concept of coherence, and the
role that the Anti-Partitioning Principle plays in it.
II. INDETERMINACY AND THE PARTITIONING THESIS
A. Legal Realism and the "Cluster" Problem
To appreciate the force of the Partitioning Thesis, it will be helpful to
recapitulate the single most powerful of the observations that led the Legal
Realists to conclude, contrary to what they perceived to be the orthodoxy
of their day, that law is significantly indeterminate. This thesis is outlined
in the work of Karl Llewellyn,7 John Dewey," Felix Cohen,9 and Herman
Oliphant,0 and has more recently been highlighted by Andrew Altman,
who has called it the "Cluster Problem.""
Llewellyn wrote:
In any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the
available authoritative premises-i.e., premises legitimate and
impeccable under the traditional legal techniques-are at least
two, and.., the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the
case at hand. Which opens the question of what made the court
select the one available premise rather than the other. And which
raises the gravest of doubts as to how far that supposed certainty
7. Karl Ulewellyn, Some Realim About Realim-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L Rev.
1222 (1931).
8. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell LQ. 17, 25-26 (1924).
9. Felix Cohen, 7e Ethical Basis of Legal Criticsm, 41 Yale UJ. 201, 215-20 (1931).
10. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Deisis 14A.BA J. 71 (1928); see also Oliphant&
Hewitt, Introduction to J. Rueff, From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a
Study of Economic and Ethical Theory x-xxi, xxv-xxvii (H. Green trans., 1929), reprinted in
Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 435 (W. Reisman & A. Schreiber eds., 1987).
11. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dumkin, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
205, 212 (1986), repinted in Philosophy of Law 179 (1. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 6th ed.
1995).
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in decision which derives merely from the presence of accepted
rules really goes.'
2
Liewellyn is making the simple point that deductive reasoning
proceeds from premises and, in law, disputed cases typically involve a
dispute as to which of two competing major premises should be given
effect. Llewellyn speaks of premises "mutually contradictory as applied to
the case at hand," and it is important to note that the dusters of premises
he has in mind are not formal contradictories as, say, "Pacta sunt servanda"
and "Pacta non sunt servanda" would be. The sort of duster Llewellyn has
in mind is not of the form "P and not-P" but of the more complex form "If
P then R and if Q then not-R." Trouble arises only if "the case at hand"
presents both P and Q and there is no metarule determining when to
follow the "P" rule and when to follow the "Q."
An aggravating factor is the ambiguity of the scope of the antecedents
of the competing rules. Obviously, the wider the scope of P and of Q, the
greater the chance of a case exhibiting both P and Q, and hence the
greater the likelihood that the "P" rule and the "Q" rule will collide.
However, Hart's core/penumbra idea points to a significant check on this
factor."3 Take, as an authority, Hart's celebrated ordinance forbidding
vehicles in the park and, as a dispute, a citation challenged by a
skateboarder. Maybe a skateboard is not a vehicle (construing "vehicle"
narrowly, rather than broadly) but certainly a passenger automobile used
for personal transportation is. Similarly, an ordinary pair of sneakers is not
a "vehicle," unless the term is stretched beyond all recognition. The "core"
of the concept's extension (cars are vehicles, sneakers are not) appears
substantial compared to the penumbra (skateboards).
The contours of core and penumbra can be influenced by subsequent
decisions. If the decision goes against the skateboarder (wrongly, we might
think), what now of the rollerskaters? Their case, which formerly might
have been considered part of the core, has become penumbral. Joggers
should nonetheless continue jogging in the security of knowing that
running shoes are core cases of non-vehides. Moreover, all may be sure
that there is no latent conflict between the "No Vehiles" rule and a "No
Bare Feet in the Park" ordinance. No "duster problem" looms here
because no subsequent series of decisions can count ordinary footwear as a
"vehide" without breaking with the concept employed in the original
language of the "No Vehicles" ordinance. If that break should come, it will
have been the product of judicial error rather than judicial discretion
exercised in a penumbral area.
Although Hart's core/penumbra point helps to confine the duster
problem, it cannot lay it to rest 4 As Altman has pointed out, the Realists
12. Uewellyn, supra note 7, at 1239-40.
13. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 129 (2d ed. 1994).




and their Critical Legal Studies successors have shown that in a mature
system of law, responding to a variety of social needs and shaped by a
diversity of values and interests, there is bound to be interference as ever-
broader but still-plausible construals emanating from a multitude of
authorities begin, inevitably, to collide-that is, to yield inconsistent
directives.' 5 Take any fact situation generating a legal dispute and any
given "remote" legal authority. In the process of considering ever-more-
general formulations of this remote authority,16 one will frequently arrive
-long before stretching beyond the breaking-point of plausibility-at a
formulation bearing on the case at hand that is capable of interfering with
-and unseating-more proximate authorities.'7
Mark Tushnet has most vividly illustrated the unsettling potentiality of
the duster problem.' Suppose a case in which a private electric utility
company seeks an injunction to oust a People's Power Collective, which
has seized the company's plant and begun to operate it along socialist
lines. Although the injunction would almost certainly issue, as Tushnet
readily grants, it is surprisingly difficult to maintain that legal doctrine,
standing alone, requires it. Given the "flexibility of legal reasoning and the
variety of available legal precedents,"' 9 Tushnet writes, a morally astute
judge might well conclude, in short, that "'Socialism follows from Shelley v.
Kraemer and Griffin v. !hiinois,'" 20 and, hence, deny the injunction.
How can this be? Sheley was a case denying enforcement to restrictive
racial covenants in a real estate deed. Grzffin was a case requiring that an
indigent criminal defendant be furnished, at no charge, the trial transcript
necessary to perfect his appeal. What relevance have these cases to the
injunction the utility company seeks? Read broadly, Tushnet answers,
Shelley stands for the proposition that the "state action" sufficient to trigger
If P then R and if Q then not-R
and boundary problems, having the form:
If P then R and if not-P then not-k.
Boundary problems present an indeterminacy problem distinct from that posed by duster
problems. In boundary problems the problem is simply the core/penumbra problem, viz.,
how to classify the activity as P or as not-P. Boundary problems can aggravate duster
problems, but in a mature system of law duster problems will exist even iK per impossml4
boundary problems were eliminated.
15. Altman, supranote 11, at 208-09.
16. Then-Judge Cardozo is one among many to have noted the "tendency of a principle
to expand itself to the limits of its logic." Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 51 (1921).
17. Altman has also pointed out that the existence of rules is not doubted, but
presupposed, in lewellyn's formulation. The difficulty is independent of any having merely to
do with skepticism or antirealism about rules, and so no amount of rehabilitation work done
on behalf of rules alone is likely to touch this problem. SeeAltman, supma note 11, at 211.
18. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Thb4 78 Mich. L Rev. 694, 697 (1980), iting S7Ley v. Kraemer,
335 U.S. 715 (1961), and Gifflin v. /nois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
19. Id. at 694.
20. Id. at 697.
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the substantive requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is present whenever a court stands ready to
enforce "private" rights.21 And, read broadly, Gnffln means that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids state action to enforce the market's unequal
allocation of important goods.2 Read in this fashion, the precedents
stand as obstades to injunctive relief.
B. The Partitioning Solution
When the Shel/ey and Grffin cases were newly decided their potential
to unseat settled doctrines aroused some amount of speculation and even
alarm 3 But the Supreme Court's and lower courts' subsequent decisions
give these cases sharply narrower constructions. Shelfty has virtually been
confined to circumstances involving a willing, nondiscriminating seller of
realty, and Gniffm to cases involving goods whose provision is monopolized
by the state or guaranteed by the Constitution 4 However deplorable
these confinements may be, judged from the standpoint of political
philosophy, Tushnet would concede that they, too, exhibit the "flexibility
of legal reasoning" in the service of a felt need.2 In the progressive
confinement of She y and Griffin we seem to find a judicial answer to
Legal Realist Herman Oliphant's prayer for a return to stare decisis:
[S] tare decisis meant something decidedly different at [common
law], being more specific and definite. It was operated in terms of
abstractions no wider than the propositions of law covering the
several classes of [a] more specific classification of human
transactions. The abstractions were, therefore, relatively narrower.
When principles were enunciated, though stated too broadly, they
related, and were applied, to only these narrow categories of fact
situations."
As particular confining decisions accumulate, they facilitate a scholarly
approach described by Karl Llewellyn:
[One] line of attack on the apparent conflict and uncertainty
among the decisions... has been to seek more understandable
statement of them by grouping the facts in new-and typically but
not always narrower-categories. The search is for correlations of
fact-situation and outcome which... may reveal when courts
seize on one rather than another of the available competing
premises .... The process is in essence the orthodox technique
of making distinctions, and reformulating-but undertaken
systematically .... The departure from orthodox procedure lies
21. I
22. Id at 701.
23. See ag., Louis Henkln, Shelky v. Krarmer. Notes for a Revised Opinioi; 110 U. Pa. L. Rev.
473 (1962); Ralph K. Winter, Poverly, Economic Equality, and the Equal Pwtei on Cau% 1972
Sup. Ct Rev. 41.
24. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 698-701.
25. M4 at 694.
26. Oliphant, supra note 10, at 74.
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chiefly in distrust of, instead of search for, the widest sweep of
generalization words permit.2
With the further accumulation of decisions, the "duster problem"
gradually succumbs to the progressive organization of a maturing legal
domain, as described by Andrew Altman:
The potential indeterminacy arising from the duster problem is
substantially tamed by the fact that the law is a structured network
in which not all norms belonging to the duster are equally
pertinent . .. . [Ihf the law were just a formless collection of
norms, a list of rules with no particular organization to them,
then the [skeptical Legal R]ealist would be right: you could
almost always find one norm[] to support one decision and
another to support an opposing one."
Altman's "structured network," Llewellyn's "narrower categories," and
Oliphant's "specific classifications," reflect a common response to a
common problem. The problem, as I have described it, is that the welter of
norms present in mature legal systems threatens to unsettle doctrine °
unless the reach of those norms is somehow kept in check!' What I have
27. See Llewellyn, sura note 7, at 1241-42; see also Oliphant, supra note 10, at 71-75.
Narrowing often opens gaps as it reduces overlap, but the Legal Realists did not abhor vacua
in the law. Their program (insofar as Lleweliyn was willing to avow one) was to expose gaps in
the law both to 1) increase the predictive accuracy of "legal science" and 2) compel
acknowledgment of, and gain room for the free play of, policy in adjudication.
28. Letter from Prof. Andrew Altman, George Washington University, to Author (April
19, 1991). Altman argues that Hart's criticisms of the Legal Realists' semantic theory "do not
touch the realist thesis that there is a pervasive indeterminacy in the legal system owing to the
existence of competing rules of law." Altman, supra note 11, at 212.
29. Joseph Raz's beautiful (if opaque) image of a legal system could be added to this list:
Institutionalized systems [such as legal systems] consist of norms surrounded by a
parameter [sic] of exclusionary reasons excluding the application of all reasons other
than the norms of the system and at their core are authoritative applicative
determinations excluding all other reasons including other norms of the system.
J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 146 (2d ed. 1990). What Raz is suggesting here is,
essentially, that partitions exist within any legal system, and that these partitions function to
compartmentalize legal reasons in the same way that a Hartian rule of recognition guards the
perimeter of law against the encroachment of extralegal reasons.
30. The late John Mackie criticized Ronald Dworkin's theory of law in these terms:
Dworkin's theory... would tend to make the law not only less certain but also less
determinate than it would be on the rival positivist view... [because it] introduces a
further source of indeterminacy. It is well known that the inference from a
precedent to a general rule supposed to be implicit in it is not watertight; but a
much larger degree of freedom is introduced if the judge has to frame hypotheses,
not merely about rules which apply directly to cases, but also about far more general
and abstract principles ofjustice and their implications.
John Mackie, The Third They of Law, eprinted in Philosophy of Law 167 (J. Feinberg & tL
Gross eds., 6th ed. 1995). Mackie might have added that determinacy suffers even if the judge
is freed only to the lesser extent of being permitted to appeal to rules that do not "directly"
apply to the case at hand. As I argue in the text, once the judge is permitted, or required, to
canvass the law "as a whole," determinacy is likely to be diminished.
31. Andrew Altman has referred to this as the "truncation thesis," which he attributes to
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called the Partitioning Thesis is simply the statement that this is the
condition of our law.
C. The Metaprindples Solution
I noted above that the existence of a "P" rule and a "Q7 rule is not
enough to generate a duster problem. There must, of course, be a case
(actual or hypothetical) presenting both P and Q. Moreover, there is no
problem if there is a metarule that decides when the "P" rule governs, and
when the "Q" rule governs instead. For example, in TVA v. Hill, 2 the
Court had to construe a statute whose plain meaning required, in the
circumstances, the waste of over $64 million that had already been spent
building a dam, which, if completed, would endanger a species of fish
called the snail darter." Two legal norms came into play- the first requires
courts to give effect to plain congressional language; the second requires
courts to construe statutory language in light of congressional intent. The
statute's language was plain and the result likely contrary to Congress's
intent. Must the dam be stopped? The Court concluded that it must
but-a Legal Realist would insist-this was a policy choice, not a decision
ordained by the "duster" of relevant legal standards.
In the TVA v. Hill example, one is tempted to deny that the two
major premises are equally available. One might say that a court is not free
to plumb congressional intention unless an ambiguity exists in the statute.
This would subordinate the "reasonable intention" rule to the "plain
meaning" rule. Alternatively, one might say that "plain meaning" is but one
guide to congressional intent, which is the ultimate aim of judicial
interpretation. The adequacy of interpretation must always, finally, be
judged by whether the intention imputed to Congress is reasonable, even if
unwise.' This would subordinate "plain meaning" to "reasonable
intention." Wherever there is a duster of legal norms, there is a longing to
locate what could be termed an adjusting mtaprinciple that determines
which of the norms in the duster is to dominate in what range of cases.
How does an adjusting metaprinciple differ from a partition? Both are
types of metaprinciple and, abstractly, both are of this form:
For any case C, follow the "P" rule, rather than the "Q" rule, if
but only if C is F.
The difference between a partition and an adjusting metaprinciple lies in
Roberto Unger. Altman's view differs from Unger's in that Altman believes that truncation is
not ultimately arbitrary, shaped only by the current state of endless pitched political battles,
but determined by the structure of a network of legal norms. See Andrew Altman, Critical
Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique 139-48 (1990).
32. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
33. IdE at 172-73.
34. According to Michael Moore, judges have a general license-wholly apart from any
subservience to legislative intent-to overrule or amend legislation that, in light of the event,




the substantive constraints imposed on the specification of features F. A
partition, as mentioned before, typically invokes traditional doctrinal
boundaries. A partition rather arbitrarily lays it down that, for example,
contributory negligence is not a defense in contract, or in intentional tort,
although it is a defense in negligence. Thus, in the above schema, F might
simply be "a negligence action," or "a Mississippi cause of action arising
before the decision in State Stove Manufacturing v. Hodges." s
Although the features F a partition picks out typically are doctrinally
recognized ones, other salient features sometimes function here, as, for
example, in Thomas v. Winchester6 (and here I "brief"):
For any case C arising from injury occasioned by a manufactured
article, follow the general rule of negligence, rather than the rule
that a lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant is a defense,
if; but only if, the article is of a type designed to injure or
destroy.
7
An adjusting metaprinciple, in contrast, seeks a synthesis of the "P" rule
and the "Q" rule; therefore its invocation of features F will have to meet a
test of adequacy that is more stringent. The tests of adequacy one might
impose are various. Kress would make it moral relevance;ss Dworkin appears
to require something more like morally best balancing of fit and justic 5 9
others, like Sartorius4' and Weinrib 4 ' emphasize overall fit or coherence.
Whether such adjusting metaprinciples (and-where needed-
adjusting metametaprinciples) can be counted upon to exist, and to be
accessible, is a matter of difficulty. Sometimes they may be, but sometimes
they may not. Reconsider Tushnet's hypotheticalY It is far more plausible
that Shelley and Griffin have been domesticated by partitioning rather than
by any identifiable metaprinciple or system of metaprinciples. From the
standpoint of determinacy, any quick, narrow, even seemingly arbitrarye
confinement of these cases is preferable to setting sail on a sea of doubts
about the morally or globally best articulation of an adjusting
metaprinciple.
35. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). See Kress, Coherence and Foraalisrm supra note 2, at 679,
for a more extensive discussion of how partitions might expediently be introduced into the
law. See also Stephen Perry, Professor Wdnfib's Fomtalism: Tt NotSo-Empfy Sepulchr 16 Harv. J.L
& Pub. Pol'y 597, 607-08 (1993).
36. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
37. Cf. id. at 399.
38. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeertinaj, 77 Cal. L Rev. 283, 301 (1989). The adequacy
criterion in Kress's present view is not moral relevance, simpliciter, but moral relevance as
ascertained with special reference to institutional facts and rule-of-law values.
39. Se Ronald Dworkin, law's Empire 176-224 (1986).
40. SeeSartorlus, supra note 6.
41. SeeErnestWeinrib, The Idea of Private law 39 (1995).
42. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
43. Arbitrariness, in the "morally defective" sense, may be held at bay by ratio-
nales-along "better decided than decided rightly" lines-for using a random procedure to
break an otherwise "Buridan-some" impasse. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements 36-122
(1989).
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Adjusting metaprinciples, to stand in contrast to mere partitions, must
necessarily be more powerful than partitions, in the sense that they have
implications beyond simply settling the priority between a "P" rule and a
"Q." Therefore, they are bound to be more liable than partitions to come
into conflict with still other norms. In particular, the more ambitiously
outward-looking the adequacy criterion one imposes, the likelier it
becomes that an adjusting metaprinciple will come into conflict with other
norms that the adequacy criterion makes relevant.
This is not to say that the partitioning solution is the more satisfactory
one. Something in us, and in the law, yearns for the deeper synthesis that
metaprinciples promise, and this brings us to the Anti-Partitioning
Principle.
III. COHERENCE AND THE ANTI-PARTITONING PRINCIPLE
A. Conceptions of Coherence
Although there are many conceptions of coherence, the two most
prominent ones in recent legal theory are-as Ken Kress has termed
them--"monism" and "internal relations."" Monism, to put it crudely,
holds that a theory is coherent if it is derivable in its entirety from a single
component principle, a "single fountain" from which all else flows. For
reasons that Kress and Stephen Perry have elaborated, monistic theories
are implausible accounts of law in modern, heterogeneous, pluralistic
societies.
The "internal relations" conception of coherence is hospitible to
multiple independent principles, for example, a fault principle and a
deterrence principle in tort law. On this view, the coherence of a theory is
enhanced when the inferential connections between its principles, norms,
and outcomes are strengthened and increased in number. Internal
relations can be insisted on with varying degrees of rigor. A minimal
conception of internal relations, for example, might hold that a theory is
coherent if
each principle must justify or bejustified by some other principle,
explain or be explained by another principle, make probable or
be made probable by another princple, or be evidence for or be
supported by some other principle.
But, as Bonjour has shown, so minimal a conception of internal relations
does not guarantee coherence. Imagine a theory partitioned into three
independent subtheories, each having no inferential or other connection
to any other subtheory and in fact pertaining to entirely different subject
matters. If each subtheory satisfies the minimal conception of internal
relations, then so does the theory as a whole. But the independence of the
three subtheories renders the theory as a whole less coherent than it would
44. Kress, Coherence and Formalism, supra note 2, at 657.
45. I at 658.
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be if it satisfied the more-than-minimal conception of internal relations
that Bonj our suggests, which I have called the Anti-Partitioning Principle.
B. Coherence andJustifwation
Coherence is important because justification is important. The idea of
justification is in turn closely tied to the idea of legitimacy. Law as a body,
and a judicial decree as an instance, make no legitimate moral claim upon
us unless, and only to the degree that, they are justified. To be legitimate,
ajudicial outcome must be justified -with reference to some set ofjustifying
authorities and justification-transmitting methods of legal reasoning.4
Moreover, in light of the fact that the law often is an accreting body,
capable of increasing in its detail and reach as judicial decisions and other
official acts occur over time, such new territory must continuously be
justified.
In epistemology generally and in moral epistemology particularly,
coherence has become prominent as elucidating the relation of
justification between beliefs.4 For example, David Brink writes:
[O]ne's moral belief p is justified insofar as p is part of a
coherent system of beliefs, both moral and nonmoral, and p's
coherence at least partially explains why one holds p."
Coherence is a matter of degree, however.
The degree of a belief system's coherence is a function of the
comprehensiveness of the system and of the logical, probabilistic,
and explanatory relations obtaining among the members of the
system.
Therefore, to be justified in holding a belief that p, p must belong to a
system of beliefs S such that all of S are believed by the believer and S is
more coherent than any other set S' of beliefs available to the believer. In
other words: "A coherence theory of justification in ethics demands that
[all of one's moral and nonmoral] beliefs be made into a maximally
coherent set of beliefs,"" rejecting those that cannot be included in that
set.
The coherentist approach Brink describes in the context of
justification in ethics applies equally to law:
The more firmly entrenched within the legal system a principle is,
the more legal weight it has. The way in which we determine what
the law requires in some controversy, then, is to see which
decision coheres best with the total body of legal standards duly
weighted. In a legal system such as ours, what the law requires in
46. Se, e.g., Frank L Michelman, Jurgen Habennas, Between Facts and Norm, 93 J. Phil. 307
(1996) (book review).
47. "Modern moral theory has been dominated by a reverence for coherence," according
to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Coheren and Models for Moral Theorizing, 66 Pac. Phil. Q. 170, 170
(1985).
48. David 0. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 103 (1989).
49. Id
50. Id.
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any given case is that decision which coheres best with existing
legal principles, constitutional provisions, statutes andprecedents5
The notions of weight and entrenchment are for Brink ultimately to be
explicated with reference to coherence, for deciding conflicts between
competing legal standards
requires the legal interpreter to engage in (or at least rely upon)
... descriptive [rather than normative] ... political theory....
That is, the legal interpreter must try to identify the moral and
political values underlying our laws and legal institutions and
practices and organize them into a coherent theory of political
morality (or at least as coherent a theory as possible). 2
In criticizing Hart's doctrine of judicial discretion, Rolf Sartorius had
earlier written to similar effect:
[T]he obligation of the judge is to reach that decision which
coheres best with the total body of authoritative legal
standards .... The correct decision in a given case is that which
achieves "the best resolution" of existing standards in terms of
systematic coherence as formally determined .... [This] model
ofjustification in terms of institutional coherence explicitly makes
relevant the systematic import of a judicial decision as seen
against an enormous and complex body of interrelated
authoritative standards"
Although both Brink and Sartorius are less certain about the desirability of
judges seeking a coherence that embraces both law and norms having no
legal pedigree, they agree that the coherentist method of justification is
one that is "holistic" at least in the sense that it requires that the judge
attend to the entire body of law.4
Saying that judges should have the whole of the law within their gaze
does not commit the coherentist to saying that they must ignore doctrinal
boundaries altogether. These may shed light on the expectations of the
parties, for example, where that is relevant. Moreover, doctrinal boundaries
may reflect real differences that the judge cannot ignore any more than
the scientist can. Just as physical science sometimes uncovers categorial
differences-between gravity and electromagnetism, for example-legal
science may also reveal what Bentham called a "natural" (rather than
merely "technical") "arrangement" of topics, such as he found in the
Synopsis of Blackstone's Commentaieis:s "We there read of 'corporal
51. David 0. Brink, Legal Theoy, Legal Intnpretafion, and Judicial Revieua 17 Phil. & Pub.
Af. 105, 131-32 (1988).
52. Id.
53. RolfSartorius, Social Policy andJudicial Legislation, 8Am. Phil. Q. 151, 158 (1971).
54. Ronald Dworkln's position on the role of coherence in legal reasoning is a matter of
(perhaps whimsical) dispute; compare the appendix to Joseph Raz, T7e Releance of Coheren=4
72 B.U. L Rev. 273, 315-21 (1992) (coherence unimportant to Dworkin), with Kress, Coherence
and Formalim supra note 2, at 652-54 (coherence important to Dworkin).
55. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69).
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injuries'; of 'offenses against peace'; against 'health'; against 'personal
security'; 'liberty'; -'property-... ."6 Such a "natural arrangement'
may be useful "in repelling an incompetent institution,"5 7 by clarifying the
precise type of mischief a law is supposed to remedy. But even Bentham's
short list will suggest simplifications (for example, combining "corporal
injuries" and offenses against "health") to the coherentist, ever restless to
have an uncluttered view of the whole.
C. Coherence in the History of Science
To get a sharper idea of how coherence is hostile to partitioning, it
will be helpful to consider a nonlegal example. For centuries, the reigning
Ptolemaic, geocentric theory of the universe was confounded by apparent
irregularities in the orbits of the then-known planets. According to the
theory, planetary motion was circular about the Earth as center. When
combined with plausible auxiliary assumptions, the theory logically
generated a range of precise, testable, predictive hypotheses about
planetary motion. Frustratingly, these hypotheses were found not to
correspond to observational data. Backward, or "retrograde" movements
were apparent in the paths of the planets. As data accumulated, they could
not be discounted as the product of observational error or mathematical
miscalculation.
Rather than abandon the key, geocentric tenet in the face of the
recalcitrant data, cosmologists in the Ptolemaic tradition supplemented
their theory by positing a system of "epicydes" intended to explain the
retrograde motions of the planets. Over time, the epicydes had constantly
to be redrawn to account for new and divergent data, but there was an
enduring belief that the refinements represented a progressive approach to
reality.
Copernicus despaired of the epicyclical fixes and rejected the
geocentric account altogether. Eventually, with the help of the theoretical
genius of Kepler and Newton and the observational scrupulousness of
Brahe, a heliocentric theory of planetary motion unseated its geocentric
ancestor. But why?
The best answer is that the heliocentric theories were progressively
more coherent than their geocentric counterparts. In particular, the
epicydes required to keep the geocentric theories in the running were ad
hoc, "nomological danglers"5a logically unconnected to each other and to
the remainder of the theory. In contrast, in Kepler's formulation both the
56. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government 29 (J.E. Burns & ILL-A. Hart eds.,
1988) (italics omitted).
57. Id at 29 n.el.
58. The phrase "nomological dangler" can refer to any posited connection between an
element otherwise well-connected to a theory and another element having, otherwise, no
connection. See Herbert Feigl, The 'Mental" and the ?hysica, in II Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 370, 382, 428 (H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell eds., 1958); J.J.C.
Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism 68, 90, 94 (1963).
82 IOWA LAWRE VIEW
elliptical paths of the planets and their merely apparent retrograde
movements were explained as consequences of a few simple, powerful
ideas.
Ptolemaic theories were rife with partitions, that is, special, ad hoc
doctrines that existed in isolation from each other and from the more
central assumptions of the theory. Ptolemaic theories were abandoned not
because they could not account for observations, but because their
elements lacked the overall connectedness and comprehensiveness,
governed by central principles few in number and of great predictive
power, that scientists almost instinctively take to be the hallmarks of
scientific truth. As Philip Kitcher has put it,
A science should be unfiwd. A thriving science is not a
gerrymandered patchwork but a coherent whole. Good theories
consist of just one problem-solving strategy, or a small family of
problem-solving strategies, that can be applied to a wide range of
problems. The theory succeeds as it is able to encompass more
and more problem areas. Failure looms when the basic problem-
solving strategy (or strategies) can resolve almost none of the
problems in its intended domain without the "aid" of untestable
auxiliary hypotheses [epicydes, for example]?.
When irregularities in the orbit of Uranus challenged the Newtonian
theory, its response was to posit an as-yet unseen outer planet, whose
gravitational influence upon Uranus would explain the anomaly. As though
following a "maxim of minimum mutilation,"' Newtonian theory treated
the anomaly as an effect of its otherwise well-confirmed central ideas,
rather than as a reason to reject them. This was not tantamount to positing
an epicyde, however, for the existence of the posited planet was itself
testable (and, in fact, was observationally verified). The crucial difference
between a hypothetical Ptolemaic epicyde and a hypothetical Newtonian
planet being that the latter, unlike the former, had inferential connections
that went beyond the immediate data it was invoked to explain.
As modern science has become ascendant as a mode of knowledge,6'
the epicydes of Ptolemy's followers have become emblems of falsehood, if
not folly. No wonder that a jurisprudence that aspires to be scientific
should be influenced by a hostility to partitioning.
59. Philip Kitcher, Abusing Science 47 (1982).
60. See W.V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science 49 (1995); W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of
Truth 15, 56 (1992); W.V. Quine, Quiddities 148 (1987).
61. The ascendancy of physical science as the paradigm of knowledge is so secure that
both its critics and its apologists seem prone to pranksterisrm Compare Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method (1975) (author's astrological chart supplied on dust jacket, in the place
usually reserved for institutional affiliation) with Alan Sokal, Transgrnsing tae Boundari.
Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 Social Text (Spring/Summer
1996) (a hoax Intended to expose the arrogance of postmodern critics of science).
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D. Coherence and Legal Reasoning
Many of the most celebrated judicial landmarks and classics of legal
scholarship exhibit the Anti-Partitioning Principle in action. Judge
Cardozo's opinion for the court in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."6 is a
prime example of the former, and Warren and Brandeis's seminal article
on "The Right to Privacy,"6 of the latter.
In MacPherson, an automobile owner was injured when a wheel
suddenly disintegrated. Although he had bought the car from a retailer, he
sought damages from the manufacturer, with whom he was not in the
contractual "privity" demanded by the line of precedents descending from
the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright. 6
Two alternative major premises presented themselves to the court.
One was a narrower, the other a broader, construal of the principle of
Thomas v. Wmchester," which had upheld a recovery, in the absence of
contractual privity, by a purchaser against a supplier of a mislabelled
poison. The narrower construal of the principle of Thomas v. Winchester
would have it applicable only in cases involving articles destructive in their
normal employment, "poisons, explosives, and things of like nature."6
Under this construal, the plaintiff's suit would fail because cars are not
"imminently dangerous" in that sense. A broader construal of Thomas
would encompass any article, known to be used without inspection by
persons not in privity, which if negligently made will, with reasonable
certainty, endanger life. Automobiles would be "imminently dangerous" in
this sense because, although not designed to run off the road, they will
likely do so if poorly built.
The narrower construal would have maintained the authority of the
"privity" rule and would have been consistent with precedents involving a
boiler and mechanical saw, and with persuasive authority that assimilated
automobiles to the coach that figured in Wmterbottom. But a decision
following the broader construal was also supported by the broader
principle, derived from a wide range of cases, that "one who invites
another to make use of an appliance is bound to the exercise of
reasonable care," irrespective of contractual privity. Such an invitation is
implicit in the very nature of mass production and mass marketing,
Cardozo saw. Moreover, the broader construal was capable, as the narrower
was not, of supporting the pro-plaintiff decisions in cases involving articles
such as scaffolds, coffee urns, bottles of aerated water, elevators, and
ropes.6 Although to say so does not fully mine Judge Cardozo's
62. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
63. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
64. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
65. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
66. MacPhemon, 111 N.E. at 1053.
67. Se Cardozo, supm note 16, at 40-41, 76-78; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the
Common Law 58-61 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 545-62
(Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to
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reasoning, the broader construal of Thomas v. Wimchester supported a wider
net of inferential connections than the narrower, and pro tanto may have
seemed the more appealing.
Brandeis and Warren's discovery of a right of privacy similarly exhibits
the role of coherence in legal reasoning Oust as that right's further history
illustrates the countervailing movement toward partitioning). Is there a
ground for legal redress for an ordinary person aggrieved by the
publication of offensive, though truthful, descriptions of what transpires in
her home? Brandeis and Warren evidently thought that there should be a
legal remedy, and were encouraged by decisions such as Prince Albert v.
Strangeos (enjoining the unconsented publication of a list of etchings
done by the Queen's consort), and Pollard v. Photographic Co.69 (enjoining
the sale and showing of copies of a woman's photograph, where the
photographic negative was made with the subject's consent).
The difficulty was that the decided cases rested on doctrines of
intellectual property, implied contract, or breach of trust, which had no
easy application to the type of case that the authors were most concerned
to meet, that is, gossip columns and scandal sheets. So long as these
doctrinal boundaries were respected, the common law would simply be
unable to provide "full protection" to the "right to an inviolate
personality." 0 The boundaries, therefore, had to come down.
The authors' method of bringing them down was ingenious, if
commonplace. It involved making an a fortiori argument for recovery in
hypothetical cases crafted to take them just out of range of the doctrinal
principle upon which the courts had thought to rest. Does a portrait
photographer impliedly contract with his sitter not to circulate prints other
than those she buys? Well, suppose the photographer makes his exposure
secretly, without the sitter's consent. Surely, the defendant's conduct is
more reprehensible now, and recovery and injunction must be allowed, but
hardly on grounds of contract.
And, again, does a person's right not to have a list of his personal
effects published rest upon his property in the profits he might realize by
publishing such a list himself? But suppose the effects listed are such
things as "stoves and chairs." Surely, as "intellectual property" such a list is
of negligible value, but as touching the intimate feeling of the plaintiff, its
publication might give much graver offense.
By repeated use of this method, Brandeis and Warren opened the
reported decisions to explanation by a "broader principle" than any
announced in them, or necessary to any of them. To obtain the intuitively
correct result in the hypothetical cases, one of two moves would be
necessary. Either the narrower legal principle would have to be assisted by
Legal Reasoning 8-27 (1949).
68. 2 DeGex & Sm 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
69. 40 Ch. Div. 345, 349-52 (1888).
70. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 63, at 193, 211.
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adding an "epicyde"-the surreptitious photographer's implied contract;
the intellectual property right in the list of household bric-a-brac-or a
broad explanatory principle would have to be posited. The former
alternative being unsatisfactory, the latter becomes irresistible, and so we
find, "forged in the slow fire [s] of the centuries,"7 a right of privacy.
A right of privacy served to connect subsystems of decision and
doctrine that otherwise would have stood in relative isolation. Therefore,
by the Anti-Partitioning Principle, a rendition of the common law
containing a right of privacy was to be preferred to a rendition without it.
E. From Coherence to Indeterminacy to Partitioning
Positing a right to privacy in the jurisprudential firmament was one
thing, getting courts to see it was another. In 1902, the right to privacy was
denied existence in New York, in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co.;12 but three years later it was sighted from a more southerly
latitude, in the Georgia case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 7"
Both cases involved the unconsented use of a plaintiff's photograph in the
defendant's advertising. The Roberson court-in the same reticent spirit as
Judge Bartlett's dissent in MacPherson-feared the flood of litigation, the
line drawing, and the chilling of press freedom that would ensue by
admitting the right; in brief it feared the indeterminacy it would introduce
into the law. The Pavesickh court was impervious to such fears and its
decision, rather than Roberson, became the landmark of the law.
By mid-century, the burgeoning law of privacy had come persistently
to resemble "a haystack in a hurricane."74 Take, for example, the
unconsented use by a magazine of a photograph of a married couple
embracing in a marketplace. Two suits, both brought by a couple named
Gill, against two publishers of the same such photograph, reached different
results in the same jurisdiction, California. 5 After sifting the cases in the
scrupulous manner championed by Herman Oliphant, Dean Prosser
observed,
Disarray there certainly is; but almost all of the confusion is due
to the failure to separate and distinguish . . . four forms of
invasion and to realize that they call for different things ....
Taking them in order-intrusion, disclosure, false light, and
appropriation-the first and second require the invasion of
something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff,
the third or fourth do not. The second and third depend upon
publicity, while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although it
usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the other
71. Id at 220.
72. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
73. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
74. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
75. Compare Gill v. Hearst Publ'g. Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (dismissing with leave to
amend) with Gill v. Curtis Publ'g. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952) (denying motion to dismiss).
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three do not. The fourth involves a use for the defendant's
advantage, which is not true of the rest.
78
Dean Prosser's article became as influential in partitioning the law of
privacy as Warren and Brandeis's had been in launching it. Like a comet
worked apart by the gravitational force of other bodies, the right of privacy
disintegrated into four distinct causes of action. Ironically, the type of case
that had motivated Warren and Brandeis "very probably"7 would not
have resulted in relief under any of the four separable theories.
The tort of privacy now exists in an uneasy tension. On the one hand,
we find a particularized field largely dominated by Dean Prosser's
partitions and precedents enforcing them. On the other, there is a
yearning for synthesis--a yearning tempered by the suspicion that
perhaps too much territory had been claimed under the Warren and
Brandeis formulation 9
Examples of a similar, if less dramatic, movement from partitioning to
synthesis to partitioning can be drawn from many legal domains, although
tort is perhaps the richest. For example, in Di//on v. LegJ" the court,
overruling Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 8' rejected the "zone of
danger" rule limiting bystander recovery in tort, in favor of the general
formula of reasonable foreseeabffity." Dillon was itself overruled in Thing
v. La Chusa,85 where the court imposed a rule employing concededly
"arbitrary lines"84 to discipline the "amorphous" "' unruliness of Dillon.
One variation on this theme is to discard a traditional framework while
retaining its categories as mere "factors," as in Rowland v. Christian,8 in
which the court rejected the commonlaw invitee-licensee-trespasser
categories as determining landowner duty, but allowed status to have "some
bearing." Subsequent application may reveal that the factors exercise the
same decisive control as before;8 moreover, the legislature may intervene
to the same effect.O
76. William L. Prosser, Pivacq, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 407 (1960).
77. Id. at 397.
78. Se4 e.g., EdwardJ. Bloustein, Privacy as an Asped of Human Dignity: An Ansmwr to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev. 962 (1964).
79. See Harry Kalven, Privacy in the Tort La--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law &.
Contemp. Probs. 326 (1966).
80. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
81. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
82. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
83. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id at 840.
86. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
87. I& at 568.
88. See Lucas v. Pollock, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 919 (Cal. App. 1992); Totten v. More
Oakland Residential Hous., Inc., 134 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33 & n.3 (Cal. App. 1976).
89. See, ag., Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 562 (Cal. 1993) (holding that under Cal.
Civ. Code §846 (1982) "the landowner's duty to the nonpaying, uninvited recreational user is,
In essence, that owed a trespasser as it existed prior to Rowland v. ChQrian.").
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Given that the law aspires to coherence and to determinacy, and that
coherence is hostile to partitions, the antinomy endemic to one
department of law-torts, for example-is bound to infect the whole.0
This is because the Anti-Partitioning Principle prefers renderings of the law
that allow tort principles play outside the boundaries of tort-even at the
expense of determinacy-to those that do not. Once those principles get a
foothold elsewhere, and the concern for determinacy makes itself felt, the
partitions that cabin the invading principles will either be newly drawn
ones within the territory invaded, or the old boundary reimposed. In either
case-retrenchment or novel line-drawing-determinacy and coherence
must be traded off against each other.91
The conclusion I draw is that legal doctrine generally, as well as the
law of torts in particular, is bound to remain in a state of deep tension
between the centripetal force I have named the Anti-Partitioning Principle
and the centrifugal forces in a pluralistic society which make the
Partitioning Thesis a contingent, but practically irreversible, truth. John
Rawls has described one such force as "the fact of reasonable pluralism,"
by which he means that
the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines found in modem democratic societies is not
a mere historical condition that may soon pass away, it is a
permanent feature of the public culture of democracy. Under the
political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and
liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and
irreconcilable-and what's more, reasonable-comprehensive
doctrines will come about and persist if such diversity does not
already obtain.
Because legal doctrine inevitably mirrors the conditions of the society it
orders, the fact of reasonable pluralism assures that legislation and
adjudication will continue to generate conflicting norms needing the
discipline of partitioning. But, just as inevitably, any network of partitions
will appear-especially to the morally ambitious and the intellectually
fastidious-as an unlovely cobweb needing to be swept aside.
90. On tores tendencies to penetrate the law of contract, see Grant Gilmore, The Death
of Contract (1974) and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979); the
criminal law, see Randy Barnett, Resitution A New Paradigm for CtiminalJustice4 87 Ethics 279
(1977); and constitutional law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
91. Simply reimposing the old boundary means cutting loose the overruling precedent,
which the Anti-Partitioning Principle is loath to do. A mere overruling is a partitioning in its
starkest form: "Apply the P rule to cases decided prior this decision, and the Q rule
thereafter," unless the decision at least attempts to justify itself which typically it will do by
appeal to overall coherence and to the merits of the Q rule. An overruling of an overruling,
or retrenchment, enhances determinacy by stanching the earlier overruling as a conduit into
new territory, but it gives additional offense to coherence by logically isolating the period of
interregnum.
92. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 36 (1993).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, coherence theories of justification and truth have
figured prominently in otherwise competing conventionalist, formalist, and
moral realist accounts of law and adjudication. Coherence has been
invoked as a constraint upon the troublingly wide scope accorded to
judicial discretion in H.L.A. Hart's account. Those who believe that an
uncabined role for judicial discretion vitiates the legitimacy of law are
drawn to coherence as a constraint upon judges. My thesis has been that,
in the legal systems of pluralistic societies, coherence of legal doctrine can
only be bought at the cost of sacrificing a degree of determinacy, and vice
versa. Those whose conception of legitimacy demands constraints of
judicial discretion will therefore find coherence to be a less than
satisfactory tool
But the antinomy of coherence and determinacy that I have described
is a frustration not only to those who find Hart's account unsatisfying. All
of us, to one degree or another, would like our law both to be coherent
and to be determinate. The legitimacy of law, and the very idea of a "rule
of law," seem to demand that coherence and determinacy both be
maintained in high degree. It is irritating, and perhaps depressing, to
discover that we cannot have more of one without rather quickly cutting
into our supply of another. Legitimacy and rule of law survive this
discovery, surely, but work has to be done on the conceptions of legitimacy
we use. Coherence, like determinacy, has little further to offer as an
expicans---an "explainer." It is time to relegate them both to the category
of explicanda-"things to be explained."
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